The Convention, the draft constitution and external relations: Effects and Implications for the EU and its International Role. EIPA Working Paper 03/W/02 by Duke, Simon.
The Convention, the draft
Constitution and External Relations:
Effects and Implications for the EU




No. 2003/W/2The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations: The Convention, the draft Constitution and External Relations:
Effects and Implications for the EU and its international role Effects and Implications for the EU and its international role Effects and Implications for the EU and its international role Effects and Implications for the EU and its international role
Dr. Simon Duke
European Institute of Public Administration
Maastricht, Netherlands
This article reviews the likely effects and implications of the draft EU Constitution on
external relations. One of the most potentially significant reforms is the suggested adoption
by the EU of legal personality. This may well open up the possibility of developing an EU
wide diplomatic service, beyond that of the current External Service, to assist the EU
Foreign Minister. However the implications of this are far from clear and could have
potentially dramatic effects on EU external relations. It is argued that more thought is
necessary on consistency and coherence in external relations, especially how the various
actors should relate to one another. The potential relationship between the EU Foreign
Minister, the European External Action Service and the President of the European Council
are of particular relevance. It is also argued that the sections pertaining to defence are
likely to be immensely controversial in the forthcoming IGC and should be rethought since
the value added of adopting an interim mutual defence commitment is far from evident. It is
also less than clear that a solidarity clause for threats emanating from non-state sources,
marks a significant advance. Finally, the inclusion of a possible European Armaments,
Research and Military Capabilities Agency in the draft constitution is welcome in principle,
but it is questioned whether this belongs in the constitution.
* Dr Simon Duke is an Associate Professor at the European Institute of Public
Administration, where he specialises in CFSP/ESDP-related issues.2
Introduction
The European Council of Laeken stated that the Union ‘has to become more democratic,
more transparent and more efficient’.
1 One of the ways of contributing to this general aim
was through the simplification and restructuring of the existing treaties. The Convention
was, of course, also intended to pave the way for enlargement of the Union to twenty-five
and to establish the institutional modus operandi to cope with the ten new members.  The
preparations for enlargement applied to external relations as well as to other areas of EU
activity, but the central issues were those that predated the Convention. The questions
surrounding the EU’s legal identity, consistency in external relations as a whole, the role of
defence, and the general communautaire versus intergovernmental thrust of CFSP, had all
featured in previous intergovernmental conferences. The imminent enlargement of the
Union was a catalyst, but not the specific cause, of the Convention’s recommendations on
external relations. In short, the challenge, as identified at Laeken, is how the EU should
‘shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation’.
The purpose of this contribution is not so much to judge whether the Convention achieved
its goals, but to consider the likely effects of the draft Constitution for EU external relations,
especially those aspects relating to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and
whether the EU is better equipped to meet the Laeken challenge.
2  It is evident that the
constitution is very much in a draft stage, with inconsistencies here and there and details
remaining to be worked out, but the basic structure of the constitution has been established.
With this in mind, the following examination will consider where there may be problematic
elements for EU external relations, where inconsistencies exist between the constituent parts
of the constitution and where the main debating points are likely to emerge in the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC). It should be noted that the traditional role of the IGC
is to discuss treaty amendments and not to solve every perceived institutional malaise.  The3
IGC cannot therefore be expected to address all of the problems of EU external relations but
it should, at a minimum, establish the basis for sound and consistent decision-making,
accompanied by relevant structures and instruments. The extent to which the draft
constitution does this will be examined below.
External Relations and the Convention
The Convention members found early agreement that it was ‘important for the EU to be a
strong, effective and efficient player on the international scene’. Many also believed that the
Union’s performance so far in this area ‘fell short of expectations, especially considering its
economic and financial weight’.
3 This reflected the common impression that the EU is an
economic giant and a political pygmy or, as NATO’s Secretary-General, George Robertson,
more accurately put it, a flabby giant. In international institutions, such as the UN, IMF and
WTO  – it was also agreed that ‘Europe lacks a common voice’.
4  The Convention
deliberations were unavoidably influenced by wider political considerations such as the
‘impression of living in a unipolar world where the U.S. sets the tone’ – notably with regard
to the military intervention in Iraq.
5  The debates surrounding Iraq starkly illustrated the gap
between rhetoric and reality in EU external relations and, at times, gave the Convention
proceedings an almost surreal quality.
Many of the earlier discussions in the Convention took a well-trodden path revisiting the
traditional tensions between those advocating the extension of the Community method,
which ‘had worked so well in other aspects of external relations’, and those who ‘drew
attention to the specific character of foreign policy, noting that it is much less legislative in
nature than many internal policies’.
6 However, consensus was soon reached on the general
observation that ‘properly coordinated’ use of all instruments, political and economic, was
central to the Union’s ability to exert its influence on the international scene. The
importance of achieving a ‘dynamic foreign policy’ was also recognised. Under the4
recommendations made in this regard, the need for unanimity in CFSP came under scrutiny.
For some, the extension of QMV to CFSP would permit the EU to respond in a timelier
manner and avoid the risk of repeated paralysis. The perceived need for a more pro-active
CFSP was also linked to the question of funding with some advocating the desirability of
improved resources, both human and financial.
Although there were calls from some quarters for the abolition of the pillar structure, it was
apparent that any changes in this regard would be incremental and would not lead to the
rapid communautarisation of CFSP or, conversely, any appreciable increase in
intergovernmentalism. It was therefore unsurprising that attention quickly focussed on the
coordination and representation functions of the High Representative for CFSP and the
Commissioner for external relations as the symbols of, respectively, the intergovernmental
and communautaire approaches to external relations.
The relatively recent addition of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) to the
Union’s external relations also made it an obvious subject for debate. In particular, the
establishment of a Working Group on Defence drew attention to what had hitherto been a
rather taboo subject – defence, or the silent ‘d’ in ESDP. The fact that it appeared on the
agenda may be attributed largely to the changes in the security environment wrought by ‘9-
11’. Again, in a rather predictable manner, the debate revisited historical divisions between
those who saw defence as primarily an issue for NATO, and those who saw the
development of an autonomous defence capability as a legitimate component of European
integration. The reappearance of well-rehearsed positions, albeit in a rapidly changing
international security environment, led to suggestions that ‘enhanced cooperation’ should be
extended to security and defence. Concern was also voiced over the lack of interoperability
between national armed forces and thus the need for better coordination of research,
development and acquisition policies.5
The question of legal identity, with which we start, was another issue that was scarcely new
and thus not provoked specifically by enlargement.
7 Of all of the innovations to come out of
the Convention, this is perhaps one of the most dramatic for external relations. At the
political level it also paves the way for the reinforcement of the common aspects of the
pillar structures and gives the Union the basis for the diplomatic representation, which is
essential if it is to live up to its (treaty-based) aspiration to be an effective actor on the
international scene.
The effects of legal personality
Article 1-6 of the draft Constitution simply states that ‘The Union shall have legal
personality’. The Working Group on Legal Identity (with one exception) expressed strong
support for the explicit recognition of the Union’s legal personality. However, for some
their support was made conditional on the recognition that the conferral of legal personality
does not change the intergovernmental character of the second and third pillars, nor must it
imply a shift in the political balance between the Member States and the institutions of the
Union.
8 For others the conferral of legal personality was built on the practical observation
that the ‘artificial distinction between Communitarian and intergovernmental aspects of
foreign policy does not have any longer any real substance’.
9
What does legal personality mean for the Union? At its most basic, the conferral of legal
personality on the Union will supplant the legal personalities of the existing bodies.
Agreement on the legal personality of the Union is also a necessary precursor for the merger
of the treaties into a single text.
 10 However, the specific characters of the intergovernmental
pillars (intergovernmental cooperation in criminal matters and CFSP) were left largely
unchanged, although the logic of a single legal personality hinted at the anachronistic nature
of the pillar structure. Debates in other working groups, notably External Action and
Defence, strongly indicated that the retention of the intergovernmental character of the6
second and third pillars did not represent a barrier to the assumption of a single legal
personality. In terms of effect, the assumption of a single legal personality would, according
to most members of the Convention, ‘lead to greater effectiveness in [the Union’s] external
relations’.
11 This remains to be seen, but at this stage it is worth considering four possible
implications of the assumption of legal identity by the Union for external relations.
i)  The Union as a subject
 of international law
The first and most obvious is that the Union would become a subject of international law,
alongside the Member States. As a result, the Union would ‘be able to avail itself of all
means of international action (right to conclude treaties, right of legation, right to submit
claims or to act before an international court or judge, right to become a member of an
international organisation or become party to international conventions) as well as to bind
the Union internationally’.
12
The current provisions of the treaties provide for separate representation of the Union and of
the Community. The Treaty establishing the European Union (TEU) stated in Article 18(1)
that the Presidency shall ‘represent the Union in matters coming within the common foreign
and security policy’. It is therefore up to the Presidency to represent the Union in the CFSP
area, but up to others (such as the Commissioner for External Relations or even the
Commission President) to represent the Union in non-CFSP aspects of external relations, as
in relations with the organs of the UN and its specialised agencies.
13 The following article,
19(1) TEU, states that the Member States shall ‘coordinate their action in international
organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold the common positions in
such fora’. Since this stipulation falls within the CFSP title, there is no legal measure to
ensure that it is upheld since the European courts do not have jurisdiction. The powers of
suasion are therefore political, notably in terms of the pressure that can be exerted by the
Presidency. Even with the assumption of legal personality by the EU, the situation is7
unlikely to change significantly in terms of jurisdiction of the CFSP/ESDP aspects of
external relations.
ii) Representation in International Organisations
The second main effect of the Union’s assumption of legal personality will be in how the
EU is represented in international organisations.  The multiple representations in EU
external relations has led to demands on several occasions, based on Kissinger’s apocryphal
remark, that Europe needs a ‘telephone number’ or, at least, a clearer identity and voice.
The logic of a single legal personality of the Union would point strongly in the direction of
the Union being represented by a single delegation in order to uphold effectively its
interests. Even in those circumstances where an international organisation is open only to
states (such as the International Labour Organisation), Member States are instructed to
‘coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They
shall uphold the Union’s positions in such fora’.
14 They are also required to keep the
Member States, as well as the EU Foreign Minister, informed on matters of common
interest if not all of the EU Member States are represented. Those who are members of the
UN Security Council will defend the positions and interests of the Union and, for those who
sit on the UN Security Council, they shall request that the Minister of Foreign Affairs be
asked to present the Union’s position.
15
iii) Overseas legation and the European External Action Service
A third, and related, area of potentially significant change is legation overseas. Currently
both the Council and the Commission represent the EU in third countries. The former is
represented by the diplomatic representation of the country holding the Presidency of the
Council. The Community, or more specifically the Commission, is represented by 128
delegations to third countries or international organisations. The delegations are recognised8
as having diplomatic status by the host states but, in spite of the common practice of calling
them ‘EU delegations’, their legal identity and thus mandate stems from the Community.
Moreover, the delegations are part of the External Service of the Commission and (not yet)
that of a common External Action Service of the Union.
The most obvious implication of conferring legal personality on the Union would be that the
current delegations would become delegations of the EU, even if the Commission continued
to perform the same functions as at present. Under the draft Constitution it is made clear
that the Commission ‘shall ensure the Union’s external representation’, but ‘with the
exception of the common foreign and security policy’.
16 The draft Constitution also states
that the ‘Union delegations in third countries and to international organisations shall
represent the Union’ and that the delegations ‘operate under the authority of the Union’s
Minister for Foreign Affairs and in close cooperation with Member State’s missions’.
17 This
indicates that the Council Secretariat is liable to have a role in the Union delegations
reporting to the Union’s Foreign Minister, who is responsible for the conduct of CFSP as
well as the other aspects of EU external relations.
18 Indeed, reference is made in the draft
treaty to the ‘establishment of a Joint European External Action Service’, to assist the
Minister, which would incorporate relevant parts of the ‘famille RELEX’, the Council and,
where relevant, national representation functions.
19
The Working Group on External Action discussed the pros and cons of establishing such as
service, replete with a Diplomatic Training Academy, but there has also been evident
political opposition (notably to the idea of an academy).  Nevertheless, the logic of having
an EU Foreign Minister and Union delegations clearly points in the direction of some type
of EU diplomatic service.  The complexity of deciding upon the relevant design,
institutional balance and competences of a European External Action Service should not be
underestimated though. The extent of the complexity is hinted at in a half page annex
attached to the Draft Constitution in which the Convention ‘agrees on the need for the9
Council of Ministers and the Commission to agree, without prejudice to the rights of the
European Parliament, to establish under the Minister's authority one joint service (European
External Action Service) composed of officials from relevant departments of the General
Secretariat of the Council of Ministers and of the Commission and staff seconded from
national diplomatic services’.
20
The precise design of the European External Action Service has to be decided upon. This
will involve potentially sensitive decisions about whether the Service will build upon the
existing RELEX and External Service in the Commission or whether a new RELEX will be
created incorporating other external relations from other Directorates General. The
assumption by key Convention players, such as Michel Barnier and António Vitorino, was
that the European External Action Service would be built around the ‘famille RELEX’
(including the current DG RELEX and its External Service, DG Trade; DG Development;
DG Enlargement; the EuropeAid Cooperation Office; the European Humanitarian Aid
Office; and some external aspect of DG Economic and Financial Affairs.
21 On the Council
side, the Service would incorporate those currently working for the High Representative,
including the Policy Unit, the Situation Centre, and the DG-E (External Relations) of the
Council Secretariat. This assumption was shared by Guiliano Amato, Elmar Brok and
Andrew Duff who wished to see the European External Action Service established as an
integral part of the Commission administration, but that the administration shall work as
mandated by the Council without prejudice to the competences of the Commission.
22
The institutional structure of the External Action Service is likely to lead rather quickly to
familiar communautaire versus intergovernmental tensions. A ‘super RELEX’ would not
only have the potential for turf battles within the Commission, but would raise questions
about how the Council (and national) officials should be streamlined into the Service. It is
also possible that the EU Foreign Minister’s position, along with the Foreign Affairs
Council which is largely outside the purview of the Presidency, may create pressures for a10
more autonomous EU foreign service which reflects the special status that many existing
national foreign ministries have. Whatever the design, it is also predictable that the
European Parliament and public pressure groups will bring up pertinent issues for the
design of any such Service, such as accountability, working methods and reporting,
intelligence support, financing and so forth.
 The list of issues raised above connected with the creation of a European External Action
Service makes it all the more worrying that this question has been addressed in only the
most perfunctory manner in the draft Constitution. Moreover, the necessary arrangements
are supposed to be made ‘within the first year’ after entry into force of the Treaty
Establishing the Constitution for Europe. Obviously, the capacity to implement this within
the specified period in an effective way will decisively impact upon the potential influence
of the EU Foreign Minister. The failure to establish a supportive European External Action
Service could severely hobble the EU Foreign Minister. In order to bring about such a
service a number of critical questions need to be answered within the confines of the IGC:
•  What is the extent of the European External Action Service in terms of the
‘famille RELEX’ (it may be easier to consider what is not external relations-
related than what is!)?
•  How are the institutions, structures and practices of the relevant parts of the
Commission and the Council going to be harmonised?
•  How will the EU Foreign Minister work with the various components of the
Service (which may also include specialised agencies)?
•  What relationship will the Service have with the President of the Council?
•  What working relationships are desirable with the relevant Ministries (which
may go beyond only Foreign Ministries) of the Member States?
•  How will the current External Service of the Commission be reorganised into
‘EU embassies’?11
•  Will the Service incorporate all crisis management components of the current
ESDP?
Some more practical considerations, such as the expense of maintaining national
representations as well as the increasing European component in national diplomacy, may
also point towards greater national involvement in EU delegations (on a seconded basis).
The increasing difficulty of identifying where ‘Community’ competence in external
relations ends and where that of the Council (CFSP) starts, also points to a greater role for
the Council Secretariat in the delegations. Issues such as weapons proliferation, terrorism,
or conflict prevention are, by nature, matters of concern for the External Service as well as
the Council.
23 In short, the adoption of legal personality by the Union and the practical
considerations outlined above will lead to a profoundly different form of external
representation emerging.
iv) Concluding international agreements
A fourth, and final, way in which the assumption by the Union of legal personality will
make a difference is the conclusion of international agreements. Under the current treaty,
Article 24 (TEU) permits the Council to conclude agreements with one of more states or
international organisations, for matters falling under CFSP.  The treaty also notes that, ‘No
agreement shall be binding on a Member State whose representative in the Council states
that it has to comply with the requirements of its own constitutional procedure’. This
stipulation does not exonerate the Member State from applying the agreement, but merely
allows the necessary adjustments to be made while the agreement applies to the remaining
Member States on a provisional basis.
Article 300 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) specifies the way in
which the Community may reach agreements with one of more States or international12
organisations. The Article concludes by noting that ‘agreements concluded under the
conditions set out in this Article shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and
on Member States’.  The draft Constitution permits the Union to conclude ‘agreements with
one of more third countries or international organisations where the Constitution so
provides’, as well as association agreements with one of more third countries or
international organisations.
24
Under the modified procedures, the Council may not conclude any agreement until the
European Parliament has been consulted, with the exception of CFSP agreements. The
Council shall act by QMV except when adopting an act in a field in which unanimity is
required for the adoption of a Union act, as well as for association agreements and the
Union’s accession to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. Under the draft Constitution QMV can be used (as at present)
when:
•  Adopting European decisions on Union actions and positions on the basis of a
European decision of the European Council relating to the Union's strategic
interests and objectives;
•  Adopting a decision on a Union action or position, on a proposal which the
Minister has  put to it following a specific request to him or her from the
European Council made on its own initiative or that of the Minister;
•  Adopting any European decision implementing a Union action or position;
•  Adopting a European decision concerning the appointment of a special
representative.
The European Council may decide to extend QMV in the Council into areas other than
those stipulated above, on the basis of a unanimous decision.  However, it is worth noting
that the old guarantees falling under Article 24 (TEU) which refers to the possible delay in13
applying an agreement due to constitutional procedures, have been removed. Presumably,
the (hypothetical) protection that this clause afforded is now provided by the ability of a
Member State to make a formal declaration qualifying its wish to abstain from a vote
adopting a European decision under CFSP.
25  The existing right of any Member State to
block the use of QMV for ‘vital and stated reasons of national policy’ is though retained. So
too is the stipulation that QMV shall not apply to ‘decisions having military or defence
implications’.
The marginal changed in the likely use of QMV in the CFSP area introduced by the draft
Constitution, along with the retention of appreciable powers by the Council (such as the
ability to create new structures, such as a Council of Defence Ministers, or the ability to
select the Chair of the Council and the Foreign Minister) opens up the possibility of
continuing institutional tensions in external relations. The ability of the Commission to
ensure the Union’s external representation still has the significant exception of CFSP. As is
argued elsewhere, the existing tensions between institutions and their respective mandates
are likely to come into sharp relief (if not disagreement) when discussion on the European
External Action Service commences.
The framework for international agreements contained in the draft Constitution will operate
under a single legal personality, that of the Union, but the practical implications of the
communautaire procedures and those of the predominantly intergovernmental second pillar
mean that some significant differences remain (broadly speaking, replicating those of
Article 24 and 38 TEU and Article 300 TEC).  The main difference between the respective
procedures lies in the role of the European Parliament, which has the right to deliver its
opinion or, in certain cases to give its assent, on international agreements that do not relate
exclusively to CFSP. The question of exclusivity gives rise to consideration of what may
happen in case of mixed agreements (those having both Community and CFSP aspects).
The draft Convention is unclear on this point.14
Generally, the recommendation that the Union be granted legal personality has many
positive aspects to it.  Indeed, it is difficult to see how the ‘Union shall uphold and promote
its values and interests’ in the wider world if, in fact, what is meant is primarily the
Community, plus the intergovernmental aspects.
26  However, the practical implications of
extending the current External Service into Union delegations, a phrase which appears
several times in the draft, needs further attention. The ability of the delegations to represent
the Union points to wider representation in the delegations, including Council Secretariat
officials for instance, and possibly to the revision of relations between the diplomatic and
consular missions of the Member States and the delegations. This also gives rise to the
practical question of how to prepare officials for their new, extended tasks.
Decision-making and the telephone number
One of the underlying assumptions of the Convention was that the Union was not as
effective as it could be on the international scene. In fact, even before the Convention
commenced an active debate was underway about how to streamline decision-making in
external relations. In the Convention this soon focussed on the roles of the Council and
Commission. Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission, advocated the idea of
making the Commission the ‘centre of gravity for policy initiative’ but also one in which it
is in ‘control of policy initiative and which identifies and articulates the common interest’.
27
Prodi’s fear was that, left to its own, CFSP risked paralysis and domination be a directoire
of larger Member States.  The case for a stronger central executive (the Commission) was
thus compelling for Prodi, the European Parliament as well as a number of EU Member
States.
28 Central to Prodi’s vision was the fusion of the role of the High Representative for
CFSP with that of the Commissioner for External Relations, currently held by Chris Patten.
The resultant post would assume vice-presidential status in the Commission and would,15
purportedly, have the ‘twin legitimacy stemming from the agreement of the Member States
and from the EP’s endorsement of the Commission’.
29
Under an Anglo-French proposal, backed by Italy and Spain, the role of the Council would
be strengthened, thus echoing the struggles of de Gaulle almost three decades before.
30
Under the proposal, a Presidency of the Council would be created, replacing the rotating
Presidency system or supplementing it. The elected president would replace the role of the
High Representative for CFSP and would, theoretically, give the EU an enhanced identity
(and answer Kissinger’s apocryphal question of whom to dial when he wants to speak to
Europe).
The compromise was to recommend the appointment of an EU Foreign Minister, who shall
conduct CFSP, but shall also be one of the Vice-Presidents of the Commission where he
shall be responsible for ‘handling external relations and for coordinating other aspects of the
Union’s external action’.
31  In CFSP terms, the Union Foreign Minister will have a number
of significant additions to his powers over those of the current High Representative. The
most significant is the Minister’s right, shared with the Member States, to make proposals
for action to the European Council or the Council. The Union’s Foreign Minister also chairs
the Foreign Affairs Council which, unlike the other formats of the Council, shall not be
subject to a (revised) rotating Presidency.
32
With the exception of CFSP, the European Commission ensures the Union’s external
representation. The new Minister of Foreign Affairs/Vice President will be one of fifteen
(voting) Commissioners, and this includes the President. The European Council, deciding
by qualified majority vote, appoints the Foreign Minister and the nomination is then subject
to a vote of approval by the European Parliament (along with the thirteen Commissioners
and the President).16
At least on paper the adjustments are eminently sensible. A Union Foreign Minister will
have a better overview of EU external relations generally and will be able to ensure greater
consistency between the Community and CFSP in external relations. There is though the
question of whether one person can assume the inevitably crippling workload, especially
when the details of the supporting European External Action Service remain murky. Much
of his (or her) ability to carry out the demanding role will inevitably depend upon the
complementary emergence of a seasoned and professional EU diplomatic service.
33
The second general concern is whether the collegial nature of the Commission will be
compromised, or even damaged, by the presence of the EU Foreign Minister. Although this
concern surfaced in the deliberations of the Working Group on External Action, the
potential benefits of having a key person with an overview of all of the Union’s external
action seem to outweigh any potential erosion of the Commission’s collegial nature.
A more pressing concern is what relationship the Foreign Minister should establish with the
two other persons with a legitimate right to speak about EU external relations. First, the
proposed permanent European Council chair, who will be elected for a two and a half year
term (renewable once).
34 The President of the European Council shall in ‘that capacity’ and
‘at his level’, ensure the ‘representation of the Union on issues concerning its Common
Foreign and Security Policy, without prejudice to the responsibilities of the Minister of
Foreign Affairs’.
35 The President will prepare, chair and organise the proceedings of the
European Council and ensure its decisions are carried out and shall represents the Union on
the international scene at the meetings of the heads of State or government. The implication
is therefore that the Foreign Minister conducts the day-to-day business pertaining to CFSP.
It remains unclear how this division of labour will work out, especially if the President of
the European Council is someone of high political profile (such as a former head of state or
government) who will be a well-known external relations figure in his (or her) own right.17
A further issue in this context is to whom the EU Foreign Minister reports, bearing in mind
that the office holder will be appointed by the European Council, on approval of the
European Parliament (as Vice-President in the Commission). It would seem that the Foreign
Minister should be accountable to the executive (i.e. President of the European Council),
but whether this is enough accountability for what has the potential to be a very influential
post, remains to be seen. In both cases the proposed positions have engendered criticism, or
even opposition, from smaller Member States who see the proposals as an attempt to
impose the will of the larger Member States on external relations.
The second potential area of friction is with the President of the Commission. One of the
tasks of the President of the Commission is to ‘ensure that [the Commission] acts
consistently, efficiently and on a collegiate basis’.
36  The degree to which the EU Foreign
Minister will be able, as a member of the College of Commissioners, to conform to this is
unclear. It is also far from clear how the quid pro quo for getting the Benelux countries to
agree to the idea of a President of the European Council, which was the two-tier
Commission of elected and non-elected members, will work in practice. In the case of the
European Council President and the EU Foreign Minister it is more than likely that the
appointments (at least initially) will come from the larger Member States which, following
the pattern of Convention debates, may then leave the Commission as the bastion of the
smaller Member States in external relations. In practice, much will presumably depend upon
the characters involved and their willingness to let the EU Foreign Minister act as the face
(and telephone number) for EU external relations.
The Presidency and external relations: a non-role?
The institutional revisions of the draft Constitution also substantially revise the Presidency.
Under the new formulations, the old and problematic General Affairs and External
Relations Council is divided into a General Affairs and Legislative Council and a Foreign18
Affairs Council. The European Council is responsible for deciding on further formations.
The Foreign Affairs Council (FAC) is chaired by the EU Foreign Minister and shall ‘flesh
out’ the Union’s external policies, on the basis of strategic guidelines laid down by the
European Council. The FAC shall also ensure that its actions are consistent. The broad
mandate accorded to the FAC leaves open the question of how security and defence issues
are addressed within the Council. The (somewhat baffling) distinctions made at several
points in the draft Constitution between foreign and security policy and security and
defence policy (see below) opens up two possibilities. Either the FAC will, as is the case at
present, address security and defence issues with the EU defence ministers present as
required or, the European Council may yet decide to inaugurate a specific Council format
meeting as defence ministers.
37
A further point of interest with regard to the FAC is that the draft Constitution specifies
that, ‘The Presidency of a Council formation, other than that of Foreign Affairs, shall be
held by Member State representatives within the Council on the basis of equal rotation, for
periods of at least a year’.
38  This may give rise to two issues. First, under the current
arrangements (Article 18 (1-5)) the Presidency represents the Union in matters within the
common foreign and security policy, is responsible for the implementation of CFSP and
shall, in principle, express the position of the Union in international organisations and
international conferences. The assumption of these duties by the EU Foreign Minister will
alter the old practice of the ‘troika’ representing the Union in CFSP matters and will make
the EU Foreign Minister a very influential figure (possibly too influential for some). It also,
by implication, makes it difficult for the Presidency to act in the potentially expansive
external relations field which may lead to clashes with the ‘non-Presidency’ FAC since they
are responsible, based on guidelines established by the European Council, for ‘fleshing out
the Union’s external policies’.
3919
The second issue that arises is that, currently, the Presidency implements certain CFSP
instruments. For instance, démarches are delivered through the country holding the
Presidency to third parties. The Foreign Service of the country holding the EU Presidency
has other broad, and often demanding, representative functions. Under the draft Constitution
it is not clear who assumes the former role of the Presidency regarding its diplomatic
representative functions.
40 Presumably, the Foreign Minister assisted by the European
External Action Service, and the delegations thereof, will assume these functions. However,
as has been discussed, the precise modalities and structures of the External Action Service
have yet to be specified.
The two key institutional adaptations in EU external relations, that of the permanent
European Council chair and the EU Foreign Minister, will have the effect of eroding the
significance of the Presidency in external relations. Arguably, this is trend already apparent
under the Amsterdam and Nice arrangements since there are already a significant number of
permanent positions (for example, the High Representative, the Chairs of the EU Military
Committee and Military Staff) in the CFSP area. In addition, the EU Military Staff, the
Policy Unit and the Situation Centre all report directly to the High Representative.
Elsewhere, ECOFIN,  Eurogroup and JHA Councils elect their chairmen for two years from
amongst their members. The chairmanship of the other Council formations will therefore
have to be organised in such a way as to guarantee the greatest possible participation of all
the member States on the basis of a strict system of rotation. It will however mean that the
Presidency will have even less of a role to play in external relations which, bearing in mind
the often considerable portion of the rotating Presidency’s conclusions devoted to external
relations, is not an insignificant point.
The EU Foreign Minister’s role has the potential to be tremendously influential, especially
since it combines the current Council and Commission representation in external relations.
The Foreign Minister may also provide a public face for EU external relations, which has20
sometimes been lost in the cacophony of voices that currently speak for the EU in external
relations. The potential for frustration is however still there since it remains to be seen how
the President of the European Council defines the responsibility to ensure the ‘external
representation of the Union’ on issues concerning CFSP, ‘without prejudice’ to the
responsibilities of the EU Foreign Minister. Similar tension may also be evident between
the EU Foreign Minister and the President of the Commission and, depending upon the
future formulation of the Presidency, it is also unclear whether the Presidency may feel
frustrated at the loss of voice in external relations.
New Petersberg tasks and CSDP
The draft constitution makes reference to the common foreign and security policy and the
common security and defence policy (CSDP), the latter being an integral part of the former.
The wording is nevertheless curious, especially with the appearance of security in the two
constituent parts. Nevertheless, for well-worn political reasons it was apparent that the
defence aspects of CFSP/ESDP would retain a distinct status in the draft Constitution, with
many of the currently distinct procedures, funding arrangements and voting rules being
retained. The basic parameters for discussion in the Working Groups on External Action
and that on Defence (which met jointly on occasion) was partly introduced by pressing real-
world concerns where, somewhat surreally, the actual commitments being undertaken by
the EU on the ground had yet to be reflected in the wording of the draft Constitution. The
discussions were also guided by the need to introduce more flexibility into CFSP/ESDP
whereby groups or coalitions could move ahead with action without obliging all Member
States to participate. Finally, the ‘D’ in ESDP had been largely silent and one of the
mandates of the Working Group on Defence was to open up discussion on defence, bearing
in mind the new range of security challenges exemplified by ‘9-11’.21
The first notable modification under CSDP (formerly referred to as ESDP) is the expansion
of the Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue
tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks,
tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking and post-conflict
stabilisation.
41 The list does beyond the existing list found in Article 17 (2) of the TEU
which, in turn, reflected the priorities and preoccupations of the WEU when they originally
drew up the list in 1992. How does this new elaboration of CSDP tasks help?
In the first place, the tasks reflect those tasks for which both civilian and military means
might be employed. This is of psychological importance since it moves the Union away
from the previous division between the Petersberg tasks and the remaining civilian aspects
of crisis management, many of which were not specifically mentioned in the Petersberg
tasks but nevertheless took their legitimacy from CFSP’s general mandate covering ‘all
areas of foreign and security policy’. The expanded Petersberg tasks also describe more
accurately what the EU is actually doing on the ground as in, for instance in the Former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (Operation Concordia) or the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Operation Artemis). The inclusion of some tasks, such as conflict prevention, under
the CFSP heading might have been expected to cause more tension since this was a task that
was assumed primarily by the Commission following a major initiative in this area in April
2001. One explanation for the relatively easy expansion of the Petersberg tasks may be that
the question of competences, at least on paper, is becoming less relevant with the prospect
of an EU Foreign who, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant
with the Political and Security Committee, shall ‘ensure coordination of the civilian and
military aspects’ of the above tasks.
42  The Foreign Ministers dual role, as a Commission
Vice-President, suggests that the Commission’s legitimate interests in a number of the
Petersberg tasks will be represented.22
The framing of CSDP in the draft constitution also mentions the civil and military assets
which may be used 'on missions outside the Union’ for peace-keeping, conflict prevention
and strengthening international security.
43 The exact range of operation of the EU’s Rapid
Reaction Force had been shrouded in ambiguity, in contrast to the EU Police Missions,
developed in the Feira European Council, which were explicitly framed with international
support missions in mind. The debate within the Convention was overtaken by events when
Operation Artemis, which commenced in early June 2003 at the request of the UN Secretary
General, already opened up the possibility of using armed EU peacekeepers outside the
region.
Beyond this, the CSDP aspects of the Union have been subject to three additional changes
that will be explored in turn. The first is the application of structured cooperation to the
tasks outlined above. The second innovation is the presence of  ‘solidarity’ and ‘mutual
defence’ clauses. Finally, following the recommendations of the defence working group, a
European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency was also included. In
each case the extent to which they mark genuine progress is questioned.
i) Structured Cooperation and CSDP
One of the underlying issues dogging ESDP was its reliance on coalitions of the willing –
sometimes merely as ad hoc coalitions of EU and other states operating outside the Union’s
purview (i.e. Lead Nation operations). CSDP does little to change this basic picture, with
the likelihood of future operations either being co-ordinated with NATO (using NATO
assets with command through the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe), or a
framework nation operation with a Member State assuming responsibility for the
headquarter and operational command elements but open to other members. Reliance on
such coalitions was partly influenced by historical reservations when it came to defence-
related issues from Denmark (with its opt-out on all defence-related provisions of the TEU),23
as well as the political or constitutional concerns of the neutral or non-aligned EU Member
States (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden). More pragmatically, the formation of ad hoc
coalitions reflected the fact that only a handful of larger Member States has the actual
capacity, or will, to provide the framework structures required for Petersberg tasks.
The deliberations in the Convention were increasingly being overtaken by practice as an EU
police operation commended in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the beginning of the year; in March
the EU assumed a NATO mission in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia; and in
June the EU responded to a call from the UN for intervention in the Democratic Republic of
the Congo. These admittedly modest, but politically significant missions, may have
influenced the debates on enhanced cooperation in external relations and the decision that
the ‘Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of
Member States in order to maintain the Union’s values and serve its interests’.
44 As with the
existing treaty-based arrangements, any decisions having military or defence implications
are subject to unanimous support in the Council.  The unanimity stipulation also remains
subject to the Amsterdam Treaty’s ‘constructive abstention’ clause.
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For CFSP, the Member States who wish to establish enhanced cooperation between
themselves address the Council (in other areas it is the Commission). The EU Minister for
Foreign Affairs then gives an opinion on whether enhanced cooperation is consistent with
the Union’s CFSP and the Commission will ascertain whether the proposed enhanced
cooperation is consistent with other Union policies. The execution of the task in question
shall be entrusted by the Council to ‘a group of Member States having the necessary
capability and the desire to undertake the task’.
46 Those Member States, in association with
the Union Foreign Minister, then agree on the management of the task.
The draft Constitution also permits those (unspecified) Member States ‘which fulfil high
military capability criteria to enter into more binding commitments’ and to establish24
‘structured cooperation’ for the completion of the modified Petersberg tasks outlined
above.
47 However, the ‘Specific provisions for implementing CSDP’, which appear in Part I
of the constitution, and the provisions governing the application of structured cooperation
which appear in Part III, differ in some significant ways.
48 The former stipulates that those
Member States who fulfil higher criteria and ‘which have made more binding commitments
to one another’, may establish structured cooperation within the Union framework. Part III
though specifies that those ‘who  wish to enter into more binding commitments’ may
establish structured cooperation. It is therefore unclear whether the cooperation builds upon
existing bilateral and multilateral links, or if structured cooperation applies to any coalition
of the willing. Furthermore, it is unclear how structured cooperation differs in conceptual
and practical terms from enhanced cooperation.
ii) Closer cooperation and the Mutual Defence Clause
The procedures for enhanced cooperation contain one important exception – they  do not
apply to cooperation in the area of defence.
49  Under defence ‘closer cooperation’ is
provided for whereby, ‘if one of the Member States participating in such cooperation is the
victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other participating States shall give it aid and
assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Article 51
of the United Nations Charter’.
50  ‘Closer cooperation’ is open to all Member States and
provision is made for other Member States to take part.
The Working Group on defence initially discussed threats stemming from non-state entities,
especially with the fallout of ‘9-11’ in mind.
51 The ‘solidarity clause’, which applies
specifically to this type of threat, is discussed below. However, the discussions on defence
also strayed into the area of armed aggression on the territory of one or more Member
States. The distinction between the ‘solidarity clause’ and the provisions for closer
cooperation on ‘mutual defence’ is therefore reasonably clear; the former applies to terrorist25
attacks, natural or man-made disasters, whereas the latter applies to more traditional notions
of armed aggression against the territory of a Member State, presumably originating from a
state source.
Generally, the determination of a number of EU Member States to move towards a common
defence policy and common defence would seem to have been reinforced in the draft
Constitution. The original wording of Article 17(1) TEU states that ‘The common foreign
and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union,
including the progressive framing of a common defence policy … which might lead to a
common defence should the European Council so decide’.  The draft Constitution now
reads, ‘The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a
common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European
Council, acting unanimously, so decides’.
52  How likely is this?
Inevitably, the well-established divisions between ‘Atlanticists’ (primarily the United
Kingdom, Portugal, the Netherlands and Spain), the reservations of the neutral and non-
aligned (Austria, Finland, Ireland and Sweden – to which should be added Denmark as a
special case) and the ‘Europeanists’ (including Belgium, France, Germany and
Luxembourg) surfaced in the Convention.
The main objections of the first group, that it would challenge or undermine the role of
NATO,
53 was partially addressed through the stipulation that, ‘In the execution of closer
cooperation on mutual defence, the participating Member States shall work in close
cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’.
54 It is incidentally unclear if the
terms  ‘common defence’ and ‘mutual defence’, within the same article, are used
interchangeably.
55 The draft Constitution appears to refer to a common defence in the EU
and a mutual defence among a group of Member States. Anyway, the extent to which this
may become a direct challenge to NATO was also shared by the EU accession countries, all26
of whom are, or are about to become, NATO members. The recent cooperation between the
EU and NATO in, for example, the ongoing operations in the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, may make the Atlantic-oriented EU members even more determined to avoid
the perception that the EU is a challenge to NATO. The reassurances in the draft
Constitution that the mutual defence clause ‘shall not affect the rights and obligations’
resulting from NATO membership, may not be enough. Moreover, the mutual defence
clause comes at a very sensitive time in EU-U.S. relations and it could be perceived as not
only an anti NATO stance, but hostile to the U.S. as well.
The neutral and non-aligned countries have a different set of political (and in some cases,
like Austria, constitutional) objections. In their cases, the extension of a defence role to the
EU may not only cause immense political difficulties for these countries, but may lead to
negative knock-on effects for EU support generally in these countries. It is worth noting in
this context the immense sensitivity of the Irish to the impression that the EU is being
militarised in the first (negative) referendum on the Nice Treaty.
The last group, the Europeanists, has historically wished to see a stronger role for Europe in
all aspects of security and defence. The latter would include minimal, or no, dependence
upon NATO or the U.S. for Europe’s security and defence. Support for further development
of European autonomy in this area was clearly demonstrated by Belgium, France, Germany
and Luxembourg after their mini-summit at the end of April 2003.
There is room for compromise amongst all of the views, but in order to reach a settlement
(which will not be easy) the following points will need elaborating:
•  What is the value added of mutual EU defence versus the common defence currently
provided through the modified Brussels Treaty or the Washington Treaty?27
•  Does  ‘closer cooperation’ on mutual defence within the EU replace existing
commitments between the WEU full members? If so, what form of supplement to the
Constitution would be necessary to replace the Modified Brussels Treaty?
56
•  The precise meanings of ‘armed aggression’ and other forms of aggression, such as
‘terrorist attack’ (see the ‘solidarity clause’ below) are not clear;
•  It is ambiguous whether the assistance provided under mutual defence arrangements
consist exclusively of national assets, or whether they refer to existing EU arrangements
or NATO arrangements (Berlin Plus in particular);
•  The mutual defence clause specifies that ‘the participating Member States shall work in
close cooperation’ with NATO. Does this mean that the participating states should be
members of NATO?
•  The mechanisms by which EU institutions work in restricted format (i.e. involving the
participating states) is not clear;
•  The manner in which non-EU states that may wish to associate themselves with Union
actions is not clear.
In order for the mutual defence clause to be annexed to the Constitution in some form or
another (since a declaration may be insufficient), the above points will have to be addressed.
Nor is this merely an internal process for the IGC to deliberate since it directly impacts on
EU relations with other organisations such as the WEU, NATO and the UN.
On the WEU, the thinking of the Working Group on Defence was that the ‘Member States
who so wished could share between themselves the obligations laid down in the Brussels
Treaty relating to mutual assistance, thus brining to an end the Western European Union’.
57
However, the existing stipulations relating to mutual assistance in the WEU context pose
some potential challenges for the EU. Article 4 of the Modified Brussels Treaty specifies
that ‘Recognising the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO, the Council
and its Agency will rely on the appropriate military authorities of NATO for information28
and advice on military matters’.  The incorporation of the treaty into a final version of the
Constitution establishing the EU would therefore have to consider this. Furthermore, Article
V unambiguously confines the obligation to ‘provide all the military and other aid and
assistance in [the treaty signatories] power’ to armed attacks in Europe.  Even if it is agreed
that Article V of the Modified Brussels Treaty is a role model, the specific concerns of the
Interparliamentary European Security and Defence Assembly will have to be taken into
account.
The second general question arising from the mutual defence clause is that, although it is
open to all EU Member States, it is already predicable that some will choose not to
associate themselves. What then is the benefit of a mutual defence arrangement that covers
only a number of EU Member States? In the hypothetical case of a act of armed aggression
on an EU Member State who is not a party to the proposed declaration (but who may be
party to NATO’s Partnership for Peace or the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council), what
obligations, if any, would arise for the signatories to the declaration?
The final point concerns EU relations with the UN which, especially after the 2003 Iraq
conflict, are a sensitive issue. The main concern in this regard is whether a prior UN
mandate must exist as the basis for any use of military force by the Union. Some EU
Member States adamantly insist that this is a pre-condition  – Finland being a prime
example. The ‘mutual defence’ clause is less than specific though about the stage at which
the UN may be involved since mention is made of the need to ‘inform immediately’ the UN
of any armed aggression ‘and the measures taken as a result’.
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The stipulations on mutual or common defence seem likely to remain controversial. The
possibility of leaving the mutual defence aspects incomplete and subject to deliberation by
the European Council would seem desirable at the moment for two reasons. First, the types
of defence falling outside those covered in the ‘solidarity clause’ are not as urgent since29
large-scale aggression against any Member State ‘is now improbable’.
59  The primary
security challenges to the Union remain those of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and those threats emanating from failed states and organised crime. These are
the types of challenges that do not depend specifically upon the presence of a ‘mutual
defence’ clause in the draft Constitution. Second, and related, given the somewhat
peripheral nature of classical defence-related challenges to the enlarged EU, is it worth
exacerbating the inevitable tensions that will be caused by the proposed clause?  It may be
too late to avoid such a debate but, at the very least, a clearer explanation of the value added
by the EU if a number of Member States adopted such a clause is necessary.
iii) The European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities Agency
The draft Constitution recommends the establishment of a European Armaments, Research
and Military Capabilities Agency (EARMCA).
60 The main functions of the agency are
outlined in Article III-207. The EARMCA is option to Member States who wish to be a part
of it. According to the Working Group on Defence the agency would ‘incorporate, with a
European label, closer forms of cooperation which already exist in the armaments fields
between certain Member States’.




64 all of whose mandates overlap with the proposed agency.
It remains unclear however how the appointment of an agency would significantly improve
military capabilities, joint procurement or harmonise operational needs. The agency would
probably comprise the same members who currently constitute the membership of the
agencies named above but in some cases, such as WEAG which also has Norway and
Turkey as participants, it is not clear whether these countries would then be excluded. The
logic of coordinating functions currently carried out by OCCAR, LoI and WEAG (to which
others could be added, like WEAO or POLARM) is admittedly attractive, but a new agency
will not substitute for the apparent lack of political will on the part of the EU Member30
States to loosen the often close strings between governments and the key defence
contractors. Some of the key defence contractors, such as the United Kingdom, have already
indicated their opposition to the proposal.
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The EARMCA also gives rise to the question of whether the exclusion of the arms industry
from the single market and competition regime should be ended, as has been advocated by
some.
66 The Working Group on Defence recommended that the head of the prospective
agency should make recommendations as to what specific rules apply to the armaments
sector with a view to a European market which would strengthen the industrial base and
optimise military spending, thereby enabling the scope of Article 296 TEC to be specified.
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A Joint Franco-German proposal for the Convention on ESDP also recommended the
adaptation of Article 296 TEC ‘in particular’.
68
In spite of these recommendations, the essence of Article 296 TEC has been retained and
the production of or trade in arms is therefore excluded from the common provisions
covering the internal market.
69 It is therefore unclear whether the retention of Article 296
TEC is compatible with the attainment of the objectives of the EARMCA. Presumably,
since the EARMCA is open to those Member States who wish to become members, the
blanket incorporation of the defence-industrial sector would be inappropriate. Given the
retention of Article 296, EARMCA is little more than a method of trying to implement the
current European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP). At a minimum, Article III-339 (which
incorporates Article 296 TEC) should be moved from its current location under ‘Common
Provisions’ and incorporated in the section addressing CSDP.
Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions Conclusions
The draft constitution is exactly that. The intergovernmental conference will hammer out
the details, remove parts and fix inconsistencies, of which there are a number. The purpose31
of this examination was not to ascertain whether the Convention actually reached a
constitution that is any more, or less, readable than the existing treaties. Instead, the purpose
was to examine the likely impact of the draft constitution on the EU and external relations.
The first and perhaps most sweeping potential change is the assumption by the EU of legal
personality. Not only will this transform the existing External Service, but it will also alter
the representation, legation and treaty making abilities of the Union. In addition, it
underpins the introduction of European level competence in decision-making in EU external
relations, most notably in the case of the EU Foreign Minister.  Nevertheless, it is
imperative that the issues raised above, with regard to the shape and competences of the
proposed European External Action Service, be thought through in a thorough manner. This
will be no easy task since it is likely to give rise to sensitive issues of political balance in
external relations between the communautaire and intergovernmental aspects. It may also
give rise to profound struggles within the Commission as the question of how much of the
‘famille RELEX’ should be incorporated into the Service. The success, or failure, of the
Member States in their attempts to address these admittedly complex issues will have a
direct bearing on the potential effectiveness of the EU Foreign Minister.
The introduction of the Foreign Minister’s post is the second notable feature of the draft
Constitution. Although long anticipated, it is far from clear how the holder of this post will
associate with the Commission, especially given its collegial nature, and the respective
Presidents of the European Council and Commission. The post, which is the result of
inevitable compromises, will (on paper) have far more extensive powers than the current
High Representative for CFSP, which will include proposing access to not only extensive
Community resources but also those of the Member States.  The possibility of an
immensely influential Foreign Minister who will be, for more purposes, outside the purview
of the rotating Presidency, raises the question of whether there will not be the temptation to
clip the wings of the holders of the post. The relationship between the Foreign Minister and32
the President of the European Council is also likely to be a difficult balance, especially
when it comes to defining what is at his or her ‘level’ and in the posts’ ‘capacity’.
The structural changes proposed by the Convention in the Draft Constitution may, as
indicated, have problematic aspects. It is also worth noting with reference to the Foreign
Minister’s post that it also has plenty of positive potential, particularly when it comes to
policy coordination. The enhanced coordination, which would stem from the extensive
oversight of the Foreign Minister, could have positive effects both for horizontal
consistence (within and between the EU institutions) as well as vertical consistency
(between the EU institutions and the Member States). The latter, in particular, would be
enhanced by greater secondment of national diplomats to the European External Action
Service.
Taken together, the combined effects of the assumption of legal personality by the Union,
the creation of the post of EU Foreign Minister and the supporting European External
Action Service, have the potential to much improve the effectiveness of EU external
relations. The potentially problematic aspects have been noted but, on balance, this must be
greeted as a positive step for EU coordination and consistency in external relations.
There are though a number of disappointments in the draft Constitution stemming from the
initial discussions in the Working Groups in the Convention and what actually emerged in
the form of the draft Constitution. Four aspects are worth mentioning by way of conclusion.
First, little was accomplished by way of introducing greater openness and accountability
into EU external relations. In spite of the fact that the Convention encouraged more use of
QMV in CFSP, rather than the traditional reliance on unanimity, there has been little
progress in this area with regard to CFSP. The continued presence of national vetoes in the33
draft Constitution is confirmation of the reluctance of Member States to introduce further
use of QMV to CFSP.
Similarly, little progress has been made with regard to accountability. National governments
will continue to wield enormous power, once they have entered into multilateral
agreements, with little influence on the part of national parliaments.  As it stands, the draft
Constitution will do little to change this and it will remain predominantly the governments
who make commitments to crisis management operations, sometimes (as was the case with
Operation Concordia in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Operation
Artemis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo) without consent of the national
legislatures. In what at first appeared to be a constructive measure, it was agreed in a
protocol attached to the draft Constitution that the Conference of European Affairs
Committees may submit any contribution it deems appropriate for the attention of the
European Parliament, the Council of Ministers and the Commission.  That Conference may
also organise interparliamentary conferences on specific topics, ‘in particular to debate
matters of common foreign and security policy and of common security and defence
policy’.
70  However, the following sentence reduces the significance of such contributions
when it states that they ‘shall in no way bind national Parliaments or prejudge their
positions’.
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Nor has the European Parliament seen any appreciable increase in its powers of scrutiny
over CFSP/ESDP issues.  Due to the decrease of influence of the Presidency over external
relations, it could even be argued that the European Parliament (EP) has less influence over
these aspects of external relations than before. Although the EP has the power to elect the
President of the Commission (and approve the EU Foreign Minister) there is little
likelihood of exerting further influence through the Commission since the President does
not enjoy voting rights in the Council. Again, with the possibility of a more active EU role
in crisis management in mind, it is significant that the EP has no influence or powers of34
scrutiny – as was made abundantly clear in the case of Concordia and Artemis.  Those
changes that were made are of little significance. The obligation of the Presidency to report
to the EP after each meeting has little significance for much of external relations (or
however much will be assumed by the FAC).  The
Second, the ‘solidarity clause’ does not add any obvious value beyond political symbolism.
Is it conceivable that in the face of a major terrorist attack, natural or man-made disaster,
that EU Member States would not assist if requested to do so? As a device for coordinating
inter-pillar coordination it may have merits, but it is unclear why this deserves specific
mention in the constitution. Other innovations, such as ‘structured cooperation’ (Art. III 208
(1)) or ‘enhanced cooperation’ (Art. 43) may also prove to be of some merit but, as they
stand, they raise a number of issues. On the former, the ‘higher military criteria for military
capabilities’ and the nature of the ‘more binding military commitments’ remain vague from
a military and political perspective. On the latter, the decision-making procedures, notably
the voting rules that apply, remain entirely unclear.
Third, the defence aspects remain deeply problematic. Until the European Council adopts a
common defence, the suggestion is for those Member States who so wish to adopt a mutual
defence clause (Art. 40(7) and Art III 209). Although provision is made for cooperation
with NATO, it remains unclear that the suggested interim arrangements will improve the
common defence. Indeed, the potential for friction is higher as this seems almost bound to
complicate the Union’s internal dynamics, especially with the sensitivities of the neutral or
non-aligned countries in mind, as well as the Atlanticist-oriented members (and future
members). Although often neglected from the debate, it is also unclear what effect this
proposal may have on the WEU, especially upon the Interparliamentary European Security
and Defence Assembly. With regard to the WEU any assumption by the EU, or a group of
Member States, of the current Article 5 commitments appearing in the Modified Brussels35
Treaty, would have unclear ramifications for the associate members, associate partners and
observers.
Finally, the need to rationalise European defence-industrial cooperation has long been
recognised. The inclusion of a European Armaments, Research and Military Capabilities
Agency in the draft constitution is a useful framework for cooperation that will, hopefully,
supersede the existing alphabet soup in this area (OCCAR, LoI, and WEAG). However the
underlying problem will remain, which is the general reluctance of the Member States
themselves to cooperate and harmonise. None of the existing mechanisms in this area gives
tremendous room for optimism. In terms of the draft constitution, it is also unclear why a
proposed agency warrants mention in the actual body of the text. If this particular agency is
mentioned, could this lead to demand from other agencies for similar recognition?
On paper, the draft Constitution has the potential to transform EU external relations and
even, in the rather grandiose wording of the Laeken declaration, to enable the Union to
more effectively shoulder its responsibilities in the governance of globalisation. The
specific task ahead for the IGC is to reach consensus on a final version of the constitution.
As has been indicated, this will not be an easy task and difficult and potentially far-reaching
decisions still have to be faced. Paradoxically, one of the potentially most explosive issues
that will have to be faced lies in an apparently innocuous declaration attached to the draft
Constitution. The debate over the mandate, composition and functioning of the European
External Action Service promises to be fascinating, if not pivotal.36
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